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Abstract 
This short paper relates the conditional object-based and possibility theory-based approaches for 
reasoning with conditional statements pervaded with exceptions, to other methods in nonmonotonic 
reasoning which have been independently proposed: namely, Lehmann’s preferential and rational 
closure entailments which obey normative postulates, the infinitesimal probability approach, and 
the conditional (modal) logics-based approach. All these methods are shown to be equivalent with 
respect o their capabilities for reasoning with conditional knowledge although they are based 
on different modeling frameworks. It thus provides a unified understanding of nonmonotonic 
consequence relations. More particularly, conditional objects, a purely qualitative counterpart 
to conditional probabilities, offer a very simple semantics, based on a 3-valued calculus, for the 
preferential entailment, while in the purely ordinal setting of possibility theory both the preferential 
and the rational closure entailments can be represented. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
Keywords: Plausible reasoning; Nonmonotonic reasoning; Possibility theory; Infinitesimal probabilities; 
Conditional object 
1. Introduction 
In the last ten years, many works in nonmonotonic reasoning have focused on the 
determination of natural properties for a nonmonotonic consequence relation that are 
likely to achieve a satisfactory treatment of plausible reasoning in the presence of 
incomplete information [24,26,32]. Further, Pearl [41] has suggested that Adams’ 
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logic of infinitesimal probabilities [ l] is a good basis for nonmonotonic reasoning, 
and indeed the core properties of a nonmonotonic consequence relation are present 
in this logic. These properties constitute the basis of the inference System P (P for 
preferential) proposed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [32], which provides a very 
cautious inference system. In order to get a less conservative inference, Lehmann (see 
[ 36,381) and Pearl [42] have proposed to add an inference rule, first suggested by 
Makinson, called rational monotony, and a particular entailment (named “rational closure 
entailment” [38]) has been defined which satisfies rational monotony. This is restated 
in Section 2. 
It is noteworthy that Adams’ logic of infinitesimal probabilities can be expressed in 
terms of conditional objects [20]. A conditional object /3/a can be seen as a purely 
symbolic counterpart to the conditional probability Prob( plcu) [ 3 11. Thus it shows 
that numerical probabilities do not play a crucial role in the modeling of preferential 
entailment, since no probability degrees, whether infinitesimal or not, are necessary 
when conditional objects are used. These can be easily handled in terms of a 3-valued 
semantics much simpler than the preferential semantics [ 321, as explained in Sec- 
tion 3. 
Developed independently of the main stream of nonmonotonic logic research, possi- 
bilistic logic [ 161, handles pairs of the form ( c$, w) made of a classical logic formula 
C$ and of a certainty weight w belonging to a totally ordered set (usually taken as 
the unit interval). A pair (4, w) expresses that #J is more certain than -4, the latter 
being all the more impossible as w becomes higher. The certainty weight is dually re- 
lated to a possibility measure [45]. Possibilistic logic copes with partial inconsistency, 
and its inference machinery turns out to express a preferential entailment [ 191 & la 
Shoham [43]. Indeed, the semantics of possibilistic logic can be expressed in terms 
of a complete ordering of the interpretations. A conditional knowledge base made of 
default rules of the form “generally, if cri then pi” can be viewed as a set of constraints 
stating that CY~ A pi is strictly more possible than LY, A -pi. The defaultrules can then be 
turned into possibilistic logic formulas ( T(Y~ V pi, wi) where the weight wi reflects a rule 
priority, computed from the least informed possibility measure compatible with the set 
of constraints. Under this ranking of rules, possibilistic logic entailment is equivalent to 
rational closure entailment. When we consider all the possibility measures compatible 
with the set of constraints induced by the conditional assertions instead of the least 
informed one, System P [ 321 is recovered. This is the topic of Sections 4, 5 and 6. 
2. A review of existing plausible inference systems 
In the following, Greek letters denote formulas of a finite propositional language. 
0 is the set of all corresponding interpretations. T represents the tautology and J_ 
any inconsistent formula. By a conditional assertion (we also call it a default rule) 
we mean a generic rule of the form “generally, if LY then p”, possibly having some 
exceptions. These rules are denoted by “cr --f /3” where -+ is a nonclassical arrow 
relating two classical formulas. A default base, or a conditional knowledge base, is a 
set A = {q -+ pi 1 i = 1, . . . , n} of default rules. 
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This paper is not intended to give an overview of default reasoning systems; comple- 
mentary overviews are provided in [ 9,351. However the approaches considered in our 
paper are not covered by these two overviews. We start this review with the probabilistic 
approach. Pearl [ 411, after Adams [ 11, models a default rule ai -+ pi by the constraint 
P(Pilai> 3 1 - E where E denotes an arbitrary small positive real number and P de- 
notes a probability measure. Roughly speaking, given a default base A, the consequence 
relation is then defined as: /? is a consequence of LL with respect to A if the conditional 
probability P( /3I ) (Y is very high whenever the conditional probability attached to each 
default rule in A is also very high. More formally, let 
A, = {P 1 P(Pilai) > 1 -E and ai + pi E A}. 
Definition 1. A formula $ is said to be an e-consequence of a formula 4 (with respect 
to A), denoted by 4 k, I,!J, if and only if for each probability measure P in A, there 
exists a function 0, such that lima+0 O(E) = 0 and P( +I+) 2 1 - O(E) . 
Adams [ l] has characterized E-consequence relations by a set of postulates which 
are the core of System P [ 321; for an extensive discussion see [ 271. A nonmonotonic 
consequence relation k obeying System P satisfies the six following properties: 
( 1) ReJEexivity (axiom schema) : a b a. 
(2) Left Logical Equivalence (LLE) : from LY @ LY’ = T and LY k p deduce (Y’ b /3. 
(3) Right Weakening (RW) : from p + /?’ and (Y k p deduce LY i_ j?‘. 
(4) OR: from (Y b y and p b y deduce (Y V /3 b y. 
(5) Cautious Monotony (CM) : from LY t_ p and LY k y deduce (Y A p k y. 
(6) Cut:fromcu~/?~-yandcr~pdeducea~~. 
Remarkable consequences of System P are the following rules [ 201: 
(7) Quasi-Conjunction (QC) : 
from (Y by and p b 6 deduce aVp b (-aVy) A (,pVS), which also 
appears in [ 11. 
(8) AND: from (Y b 0 and (Y i_ y deduce LY i_ /3 A y. 
A syntactic entailment, denoted by b,,, from A = {ai --+ pi ) i = 1,. . . , n}, can then 
be defined [ 321: A k,, #I -+ 1+9 (or 4 bp Cc, for short) iff c/~ b $ can be derived from 
{(Yi b /3i I i = 1,. . . ,n} using System P. 
Lehmann and Magidor [38] have shown the following equivalence: 
Proposition 2. 4 b, $ if and only if 4 bp fi. 
The set A’ = (4 4 1+9 1 4 bp 1,4} is usually considered as the minimal set of 
conclusions that any reasonable nonmonotonic consequence relation, applied to default 
reasoning, should generate. However, System P is cautious and suffers from a so-called 
“irrelevance” problem: 3 if a formula 6 is a plausible consequence of (Y, and if a formula 
p is a formula composed of propositional symbols which do not appear in the default 
base, then 6 cannot be deduced from (Y A p. For example, from the rule “generally, birds 
fly” it is not possible to deduce that “red birds fly too” (when no conditional assertion 
’ The name “irrelevance” is partially a misnomer 
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in the knowledge base deals with “red” things). This cautious behavior can be avoided 
if the consequence relation also satisfies the rational monotony property proposed by 
Makinson, and extensively discussed in [ 381: 
(9) Rational Monotony (FM) : from CY b 6 and CY /& -p deduce a A /? k S. 
Here cy k -p means that a b -p does not hold. This property states that in the absence 
of relevant information in the conditional knowledge base A leading to LY + l/? E A’, 
one can deduce the same thing from a or from LY A /3. One way of adding the rational 
monotony to A’ is to use the System Z proposed by Pearl [42]. System Z builds an 
ordering on the default rules in A, based on the notion of tolerated default: 
Definition 3. A default rule cx -+ p is said to be tolerated by A iff there exists an 
interpretation w such that w k u A p ( w is then said to verify a + p following Adams 
terminology) and for each LYE -+ pi in A, o /= T&i V /?i (w is said to satisfy (i.e., o 
does not falsify) ai + pi). 
This definition is the basis for producing an ordered partition {&, Al,. . . , Ak} of 
A such that any rule in Ai is tolerated by Ai U . . . U dk. Then, Pearl [42] attaches 
the weight Z(d) = i E N to each default rule d E Ai. This ranking of default rules 
induces a ranking of interpretations, namely it defines a function K which characterizes 
a partition of a. The rank K(W) of an interpretation w is the rank of the highest-ranked 
rule falsified by w, augmented by the unit, i.e., 
( 
0, if w satisfies each default in A, 
K(W) = rnax{Z(di) + 1 ( w k ai A -pi}, otherwise. 
Finally, a nonmonotonic inference relation, denoted b, is then defined as 
4 b, 9 if and only if ~(4 A 9) < ~(4 A +), 
where K is extended to formulas by ~(4) = min{K(w) ) w /= 4). It can be shown 
that b, handles correctly the above particular irrelevance problem and satisfies all the 
rules of System P and the rational monotony property. As shown by Goldszmidt and 
Pearl [28] the inference bi corresponds to a particular closure of A’ under the rational 
monotony property called by Lehmann “the rational closure” [ 381. Pearl [42] has also 
suggested a more conservative inference, denoted by kc, and defined by: 
+!J b,, I++ if and only if A U {q!~ -+ -(cl} is inconsistent, 
where a default base A’ is said to be inconsistent iff there exists a nonempty subset A 
of A’ such that no default in A is tolerated by other defaults in A. An example of an 
inconsistent default base is A = {a + p,cr --+ -,B}. Another example of inconsistent 
default base is when there exists default rules with an inconsistent antecedent. From 
now on, we will only consider consistent default bases. i_a is equivalent to bp [ 421. 
In their System Z+, Goldszmidt and Pearl [29] have proposed to encode defaults 
in A by means of constraints of the form K( Cyi A pi) + Ci < K(CYi A Tpi) where Ci is 
interpreted as the minimal cost charged to interpretations falsifying the rule ai --+ pi; 
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the larger ci the stronger is the rule. This type of constraint can be justified by viewing 
K as a Spohn’s [44] function, since it is equivalent to ~(~Pilcq) > ci in terms of the 
conditionalized K-function, and where, by definition, K( lpi\q) = K( Ct!i A lpi) - K( ai) 
(using I = min{K(aj A pi), K(& A lpi)}); it thus expresses that (~j A lpi is all 
the more impossible as ci is large. 
Lastly, let us briefly mention the conditional (modal) logic-based approach to default 
reasoning. The connection between conditional logics and nonmonotonic reasoning is 
not surprising since some properties of Lewis’ logics of counterfactuals [39] appear 
to be natural for default reasoning. Several authors like Boutilier [7], Lamarre [ 331 
and Crocco [ 1 l] have investigated these links. Lamarre [33] works with a class of 
conditional logics called V [39]. More precisely, he proposes to construct, given a 
default base, a system of spheres called the “big normal model” and he shows that the 
inference relation, denoted kV, given by this big normal model is equivalent to b, in 
System Z. 
3. Conditional objects in default reasoning 
An approach to reasoning with conditional objects, a symbolic counterpart to condi- 
tional probabilities, has been recently developed [ 17,201. It turns out to be equivalent 
to System P but with a semantics simpler than the ones proposed by Adams or by 
Lehmann. A conditional object is a pair of two propositional formulas (Y, /I denoted 
by p]cv and which reads “p knowing Q”. A tri-valued semantics already suggested by 
De Finetti [ 121, is attached to conditional objects, where the two classical truth values 
{T, F}, and a third value 2 which means “inapplicable”, can be assigned as follows: 
if t(a) = T, 
if t(a) = E 
where t(a) is the truth value (in the classical sense) of the formula (Y. Notice that the 
3-valued truth functions t never assign the third truth value I to classical formulas. A 
default rule LY -+ /? is then encoded by a conditional object ,f3la. When t(Pla> = I, the 
default rule (Y --+ p does not apply (since t(a) = F). This contrasts with a modeling 
of the rule by the material implication. The set of conditional objects defined on a 
propositional language is then a superset of the language if classical formulas /3 are 
mapped to conditional objects PIT, whereby p is conditioned by the tautology. 
The entailment ka: between two conditional objects extends the propositional entail- 
ment. It is defined from the total ordering between truth values F < I < T. Namely, /==@ 
is defined as [31]: 
Pla l=:c 4~ iff ~t,t(Pla) < t(6ly). 
The ordering < comes down to interpreting I as “unknown” (i.e., Z = {T, F}) and 6 
as “not more true than”. It can be checked that this is equivalent to a pair of classical 
entailments, namely 
Pla kc 6/y iff (Y A p k S A y and y A -4 /= a A -/I 
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Table I 
NQC(PlwW) 
f(Plff) NW 
F I T 
F F F F 
I F I T 
T F T T 
(if cr = y = T, /? /= S is recovered). Viewing the models of u A p as the set of 
examples of the rule LX -+ p (they verify it), and the models of cy A lp as the 
set of counterexamples (or exceptions) of (Y -+ p (they falsify it), the entailment 
Pla /=@ 617 means that each example of LY -+ p is also an example of y ----f 6 and 
that each counterexample of y -+ S is also a counterexample of a -+ p. The above 
entailment bc suggests that a conditional object PI cr is entirely characterized by the 
two formulas LY A /? and LY A -p, similarly to the conditional probability P(plcr) which 
is also characterized by the two numbers P ( a A /I) and P ( (Y A +) (namely P (PIa) = 
P(aAp)/(P(aA+) +P(aAp)). 
In order to define the inference of a conditional object from a set of conditional 
objects, we need to combine conditional objects. There are several possible approaches 
to the conjunction, the disjunction, the negation and the nesting of conditional objects 
[ 17,201. In the context of reasoning with rules having exceptions, only a fragment of 
conditional object theory is useful. It only exploits one possible definition of conjunction, 
corresponding to the quasi-conjunction introduced by Adams [l] in his probabilistic 
setting. The quasi-conjunction QC(plcu,Sly) of two conditional objects /3((~ and 61~ 
is defined by the truth table in Table 1. This table can be justified in the following 
way: QC reduces to the usual notion of conjunction on {7’, F} x {T, F}. Viewing the 
set {p/a, 81~) as a conditional knowledge base, if the two rules are inapplicable, the 
base is inapplicable (QC(Z, I) = I). If one of the two rules is inapplicable, the base is 
equivalent to the other rule (QC( I, F) = QC( F: Z) = F; QC( I, T) = QC(7’, I) = T). 4 
The quasi-conjunction can be equivalently expressed as the conditional object [ 171: 
QCWlw 61~) = ( -aVP) A (~yV8)laVy. 
Note the resemblance with property (7) of System I? The quasi-conjunction is clearly 
associative. 
The inference, in the sense of conditional objects, of a rule from a set of defaults d = 
{CXyi-$piIi=l,..., n} is defined in terms of the above conjunction and consequence 
relation: a rule cr -+ /3 is a consequence of A (denoted by A kc0 a + p) iff there exists 
a subset S of rules such that QC(s) bo PI a, where QC( S) is the quasi-conjunction of 
all conditional objects formed with the rules in S (changing ai + pi into Pi]ai). When 
S = 0, QC(S) = yll (f or an arbitrary y) by convention, and only conditional objects 
4Note that the truth value of QC(Pla,Gjr) can be simply obtained by taking the minimum of the two 
valuations of the components in the sense of the following ordering + between the truth values: I > 7’ + F 
(not to be confused with the ordering underlying k=@). 
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p[cv such that (Y k p are deduced (they are conditional tautologies). The conditional 
object inference relation is thus defined as: 
Definition 4. A k=cO a --) j? iff 3s C_ A such that QC( S) kc Pla. 5 
This definition indicates that the presence in A of rules of the form I + cx does 
not affect the result of the inference, since QC( S, (Y(I) = QC( S) while they make A 
inconsistent in the sense of the toleration-based inference of Pearl [42]. kc0 has the 
same deductive power as System P (in which I k y is valid). Namely, 
Proposition 5 (see [20]). A &-, (Y ---f j3 ifSa -+ P E A’. 
The proof takes advantage of the fact that the quasi-conjunction rule can be derived 
from System P The inference relation & satisfies all the rules of System P but fails to 
satisfy rational monotony. Nevertheless, the tri-valued semantics of conditional objects is 
really simpler than the preferential semantics proposed by Kraus et al. [ 321 for System 
P, and can be easily explained using the notion of applicable and inapplicable rules, 
of examples and counterexamples to a rule, without any need to resort to sophisticated 
notions such as infinitesimal probabilities. 
4. The possibilistic uncertainty setting 
4.1. Basic notions 
Possibility theory is based on the notion of a possibility distribution T which is a 
mapping from the set fl to the interval [ 0, 1 ] and thus provides a complete ordering 
of interpretations where the most plausible ones get the highest value 1. Here, the unit 
interval is taken as a prototypical bounded totally ordered scale. r(w) > 0 means that 
w is only somewhat plausible, while rr( W) = 0 means that w is impossible. r restricts 
the set of interpretations according to the available knowledge about the normal course 
of things. V(W) > rr(w’) means that w is more plausible than w’. r is said to be 
normal if 3w such that a(o) = 1; and any such o corresponds to a “normal state of 
facts”. Note that if we choose a threshold a > 0 and consider {w 1 r(w) > u} we get 
what Lewis [39] calls a “sphere” around the most plausible interpretations. Hence rr 
encodes a system of spheres, a unique one for the whole set of interpretations. Two set 
functions are associated with r: 
l The possibility degree I7( 4) = sup{lr(w) 1 o k 4) which evaluates to what 
extent 4 is consistent with the available knowledge expressed by z-. 17 satisfies the 
characteristic properties: 
5 Note that & cannot be defined for a conditional knowledge base A by QC( A) & /31(~ only. Otherwise 
A would not always entail conditional objects associated with the defaults it contains (since some defaults 
may be inapplicable while others are verified). Indeed if A = {a -+ & y -+ S} with -(Y A (y A 6) $ I we 
do have t(Pla) = I and ~(61~) = T for some interpretations; hence r(QC(A)) < t(,Bja) does not hold. With 
Definition 4, if A = {a - p}, {a + p} kc0 y + 6 is equivalent to Pla & 6)y or y b 6. 
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l The dual necessity (or certainty) degree 
N(4) = 1 - n( 74) = inf{ 1 - n-(w) 1 w + 74) 6 
which evaluates to what extent C#J is entailed by the available knowledge. We have: 
W,WN(4 A$) =min(N(@),N(@)). 
Note that N( 4) and N( -4) are only weakly related by min( N(4), N( -4)) = 0 if 
r is normal. The normalization condition of Z- reflects the consistency of the available 
knowledge represented by n-, since otherwise we would have V#, N( +A -x$) = N( _L) > 
0. A systematic assumption in possibility theory is that the actual situation is normal, 
i.e., it is described by any w such that ~(0) is maximal, given other known constraints. 
It justifies the evaluation n( 4), and contrasts with the probabilistic evaluation of the 
likelihood of events. Moreover N(4) > 0 means that C$ holds in all the most normal 
interpretations. Under the assumption that the actual situation is normal, N(4) > 0 
means that 4 is an accepted belief, i.e., one may act as if 4 were true. And indeed the 
set of formulas (4 1 N(4) > 0) is deductively closed. It is a belief set in the sense of 
Gardenfors [ 251. 
Possibility theory is driven by the principle of minimum speciJcity. A possibility 
distribution rr is said to be at least as specijc as another Z-’ if and only if for each 
interpretation w it holds that Z-(W) < r’(w). Then, Z- is at least as restrictive and 
informative as n-‘. Given a set of constraints restricting a feasible subset of possibility 
distributions, the best representative is the least specific feasible possibility distribution, 
which assigns the highest degree of possibility to each world, since it is also the least 
committed one. 
An ordinal conditioning notion can be defined by means of the Bayesian-like equation 
fl(+A9) =min(n(W),~(+)) 
when n(4) > 0. fl(+l4) is then defined as the greatest solution to the previous 
equation in accordance with the minimum specificity principle. It leads to 
1, ifn(4ArCI) =n(G) 
rr(444) = 
(i.e., if Z7(+ A $) b DC4 A +)>, 
n(4 * $) , otherwise 
(i.e., if n(~$r\+) < n(#A+>>, 
when L7(&) > 0. If Lo = 0, then by convention n($ld) = 1, Vfi # 1. The 
conditional necessity measure is simply defined as N(1+414) = 1 - L7(-@/4). Thus 
N(@I$) > 0 means that in the context 4, Cc, is accepted. If n(4) > 0, it can be easily 
h In fact, any order-reversing map on the unit interval will do as well instead of the function 1 - n. Its choice 
does not affect the result of the approach to default reasoning. 
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checked that iV($(4) > 0 iff n(+ A $> > Z7(+ A +>, which means that accepting $ 
in the context 4, is equivalent to saying that 4 A Ic, is more plausible than 4 A -$. 
Remark. It is also possible to define a numerical conditional possibility measure using 
the product instead of min in the Bayesian-like relation (see [ 171 for justifications). 
As pointed out in [ 181, this is equivalent to the conditioning of Spohn’s [44] kappa 
functions through a resealing. Note that the min-based conditional necessity measure 
N(PIcY) only requires a purely ordinal (possibly finite) scale for assessing the certainty 
levels. This contrasts with Spohn’s [ 441 conditionalization which requires a scale where 
addition is meaningful. 
4.2. Possibilistic entailment represents rational nonmonotonic inference 
In the last section, the unit interval is understood as a mere ordinal scale, which 
means that possibility theory is a qualitative theory of uncertainty, as long as we use the 
min-based conditioning and not the product-based one. Therefore, to each possibility 
distribution Z-, we can associate its comparative counterpart, denoted by >r, defined by 
w >rr w’ if and only if rr( w) > r( w’), which induces the well-ordered partition [44] 
{El.. . , E,,+,} of 0, that is, {El,. . . ,&+I} is a partition of 0 such that: 
V’w E Ei,‘V’w’ E E,~,T(oJ) > v(d) iff i < j (for i < n+ 1, j 3 1). 
E,,+I is a subset of impossible interpretations such that n(w) = 0, and is therefore 
denoted El. In a similar way a complete pre-order &. is defined as: ‘d’w E Ei, ‘v’d E 
E,i,w&o’iffi< j(fori<n+l,j> l).Andw=,o’iffw>,w’andw’&w.By 
convention, El represents the most normal states of facts. Thus, a possibility distribution 
partitions 0 into classes of equally possible interpretations. Note that each possibility 
distribution has exactly one comparative counterpart, but a given comparative possibility 
distribution >p admits an infinite number of representations on the unit interval. The use 
of EL enables a subset of impossible interpretations to be distinguished, with respect to 
>7P 
From any comparative possibility distribution >a, a comparative possibility (respec- 
tively necessity) relation can also be defined for any pair of formulas 4 and Cc, as 
f$ 3/l * eJ 36J I= 6tJo’ + q, 6J 2, W’ W L7( 4) 2 LZ( @) (respectively 4 aN $ +. 
3w k -$, ‘VW’ + -4, w & w’ H N( 4) 3 N(q)). Comparative possibility relations 
can be equivalently defined by the following properties [ 14,391: Va, V’p, V-y, 
(i) completeness (ac 3~ p or /3 2” cu); 
(ii) transitivity; 
(iii) T >n I, where >!I is the strict part of the ordering >n; 
(iv) T >D LY 217 I, Va; 
( v) (Y 3 II p ==+ y V a >:n y V /3 (characteristic property) ; 
(vi) if LY k p then /I 211 LY (syntax independence). 
Comparative necessity relations are defined by duality, i.e., 4 aN fi + -$ aI7 -4. 
In the finite case, it has been shown that the only numerical counterparts to comparative 
necessity relations are necessity measures [ 141. Comparative necessity relations are 
closely related to the epistemic entrenchment relation underlying any revision of a belief 
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set in the sense of Gtidenfors [ 251; see [ 181. Comparative necessity and possibility 
relations are compatible with classical entailment in the sense that 4 2N $ and 4 >n $ 
whenever I++  4. No w, let us introduce the notion of possibilistic entailment. 
Definition 6. Let >p be a comparative possibility distribution and {El,. . . , E,,, El} 
be the well-ordered partition induced by >,r. An interpretation w is a r-preferred model 
of a formula 4 with respect to >n iff: (i) o b 4, (ii) w $! EL, and (iii) ,Bw’, W’ k 4 
and w’ >,, o. 
The possibilistic entailment /==, can then be defined in the spirit of Shoham’s [43] 
proposal: 
Definition 7. A formula II, is a possibilistic consequence of 4 with respect to >?r, 
denoted by 4 k, +, iff +AI+!I >rf +A -$, that is, each rr-preferred model of 4 satisfies 
* [191. 
To explain Definition 7, let w be a preferred model of 4 in the sense of Definition 6 
(this implies that 4 $ I, and 4 >n 1). For simplicity, let rr be a possibility distribution 
representing >n and 17 the corresponding possibility measure. Clearly r(w) = I7( 4) > 
0. Since each preferred model of cfi satisfies 9, it means that II(#) = ZI7(4 A $) > 
I7($ A -$); indeed no model u’ of -@ is preferred among the models of 4, and 
ZI( 4) = max (17( 4 A t,b) , l7( 4 A +) ) . The consequence relationship /==, satisfies most 
of the remarkable properties recalled in Section 2: LLE, RW, AND, OR, CM, Cut and 
RM, as well as a weakened version of reflexivity and a strong form of consistency 
preservation [ 261: 
v Restricted Rejkrivity (RR): if o f J_ then LY k,, a; 
0 Consistency Preservation (CP) : 1 (cr +I, I). 
CP and RR are typical of the possibilistic approach. CP, RR, Cut and AND imply what 
could be called “Nihil ex absurdo” [4] : ~(1 b, a). For suppose _L /=, LY, u $I; then 
by RR, ~OJ h=, T(Y and since (Y A T(Y k, cy, Cut leads to -XX b, LY and to SLY k, I 
using AND. This result violates CP; and if & = I, then ‘(I k, l-) is an instance of 
CP. Inferences from a contradictory statement ((Y = I) are thus not allowed in the sense 
of preferential entailment; while I classically entails anything, it should preferentially 
entail nothing. As said above (Y k, p is equivalent to cr A p >n LY A l/? where >n 
is the strict possibility relation induced by n-. Conversely a >n p comes down to a 
possibilistic entailment: 
Lemma 8 (see [ 41). a >n /3 is equivalent to a V P +, -P. 
Proof. Note that the strict preference relation >n verifies the property aV y >n PV y + 
a >I/ p (by contraposition of property (v) ). Hence LY >17 P entails a A 1P >n P 
(where y = crA,B). Letting 4 = aVp and (/I = -P, cuA+ >n P reads +A$ >n dA-$. 
This is equivalent to # +, 9, i.e., rrv /3 +=, -P. Conversely, ff VP +, -P is equivalent 
to (CX v p) A -p >,, (Q. V /3> A p, i.e., cx A TP >n p which, along with IX 3n ff A -/3 
leads to LY >n /3 by transitivity. 0 
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Lemma 8 is closely related to Gtidenfors and Makinson’s [ 261 representation results 
for nonmonotonic inference by means of expectation orderings which correspond to 
comparative necessity relations, except that they do not request T >N 1. Conversely, 
any nonmonotonic inference relation b satisfying the above properties derives from a 
possibility distribution on R. 
Theorem 9 (see [ 41) . Given a nonmonotonic consequence relation b satisfying OR, 
RR, CP, LLE, RW, AND and RM, the relation > defined by LY > /3 iff a V p /- --/I, is 
a comparative possibility relation. 
Proof. We have to show that the relation > satisfies all axioms of a comparative 
possibility relation: 
(i) Completeness: cr > p or p 2 LY, or equivalently -((Y > p and j3 > cu). It states 
that we cannot have (Y V /3 b -/I and (Y V /3 b YX. Indeed, otherwise using 
“AND” leads to (Y V p k -XX A -#I which violates CP, 
(ii) Transitivity: /3 2 cy and S 3 /3 implies S 3 cy. It amounts to proving the 
inconsistency of CY V p F -p, j3 V S k 4 and LY V S b 4. As in Gardenfors 
and Makinson [ 261 we first prove LY V p V S i_ -6, applying OR to (Y V S b 76 
and 4 A p k -16; the latter holds from RR and RW provided that 4 A p $ 
1. If 4 A p = I then S V /I = S and by LLE applied to (Y V S b 76, 
LY V p V S b 4. Next, (Y V /3 V S b -+I A 43 obtains via contraposition of 
RM applied to (Y V p V S b -4 and 0 V S b 4 (letting (Y’ = (Y V p V 6, 
p’ = p V S, and S’ = 4). Lastly RM can again be applied to (Y V j3 V S b l/? 
(that follows from (Y V p V S b up A 4) and LY V p ‘& -p in the same 
way, to conclude (Y V p V S b T(Y A lp. Combining the results by the AND 
rule leads to (Y V p V S b icy A -/? A 4 which in turn is not compatible 
with CP. 
(iii) Nontriviality: T > I expresses that T b T (RR). 
(iv) (Y > I or equivalently -( _L > cr), i.e., ~(a b YX). Indeed assume Q k ICY 
then if (Y $ I, using RR and AND leads to (Y b I which contradicts Cl? _L 3 _I_ 
follows from -(I b cr), with (Y = T. 
(v) S V (Y > S V p implies a > p. It amounts to prove that (Y V /? V S k l/3 A -6 
implies LY V p k l/3. First note that (Y V p V S b -IP A 4 is equivalent to 
aV(pV6) ~~(pVS>.Thiswritesn>SVP.MoreoverwehaveSVP>fl 
because it expresses that -(S V p b -p A 4) which is due to CP and proves 
(vi). The result follows by transitivity. Cl 
A similar representation theorem is proved by Gardenfors and Makinson [26]. In 
the finite setting, the existence of a comparative possibility relation >n on formulas 
ensures the existence of a corresponding possibility distribution 7~ such that x(w) > 
r( w’) H (Y >II /I where (Y and /3 are the propositions whose only models are w and w’ 
respectively. Lemma 8 ensures that the comparative possibility relation obtained from 
Theorem 9 leads to a possibilistic inference that coincides with the original nonmono- 
tonic inference. Thus the seven postulates in Theorem 9 can be viewed as the basic 
properties of possibilistic inference. 
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5. Possibilistic semantics of conditional objects 
A conditional assertion “generally cy’s are p’s”, is represented in the possibility theory 
framework by the following relation: “CY Ap >n (Y A-p”, which means that the situation 
where cr A p is true is more possible than the situation where a A -p is true [ 41. Hence, 
a set of conditional assertions A = {LYE + pi 1 i = 1,. . . , n} can thus be viewed 
as a family of constraints C = {ai A pi >I] (pi A -pi 1 i = 1,. . . , n} restricting a 
family of possibility distributions over the interpretations of a language. When the set 
of constraints is consistent, A only contains rules ai -+ pi such that ai # I, otherwise 
the constraint ai A pi >n ai A lpi is violated. We denote by n(A) all the comparative 
possibility distributions satisfying the set of constraints C. Then a natural definition for 
the entailment, first proposed in [23], is: 
Definition 10. A formula 9 is a universal possibilistic consequence of 4, denoted by 
4 /=vn r,!~, iff $ is a possibilistic consequence of 4 for each comparative possibility 
distribution of n(A), that is, {CZ~ A /3i >m ai A lpi / i = 1, . . , n} implies 4 A Cc, >I/ 
4 A 3. 
The possibilistic modeling of default rules (Y --+ /? is also in accordance with con- 
ditional objects (since only LY A j? and cr A -JP are involved in both settings). Let us 
now develop the possibilistic semantics of conditional objects. In connecting conditional 
objects to probabilities, Goodman et al. [ 3 I] have proved that the entailment between 
conditional objects, i.e., /?]a /==c 817 * p A cy b 8 A y and T(Y V /3 /= my V 6, is equiv- 
alent to the probabilistic condition, ‘dP, P( P]a) < P( Sly) (up to pathological cases). 
A similar result holds in possibility theory for positive possibility distributions (i.e., v 
such that V’w, r(o) > 0, or equivalently >a with EL = 8): 
Proposition 11 (see [211). For any a,y # I, Pla kc Sly if and only iffor all 
positive possibility distributions such that p A (Y >n ~/3 A LY holds, 8 A Y >/I 4 A y 
also holds. 
The proof of the “only if” part is an easy matter using the definition of kc0 and 
the monotonicity and the transitivity of >n. The “if part” of the proof is obtained 
by a proper choice of >p. Note that starting from a consistent set of constraints on 
a comparative possibility relation, it is not possible to predict if the corresponding 
possibility distribution is positive or not. In particular, a positive solution always exists. ’ 
In the following, we thus restrict to the set of positive possibility distributions n+(A) 
in n(A). This assumption is also useful when comparing to the conditional object 
inference. Indeed, A kc0 LY --+ p whenever (Y b p in the classical sense. In particular, 
when A is empty, A only entails these conditional tautologies. A necessary condition 
for identifying the conditional object inference with the possibilistic one is then that 
7 Comparative possibility relations uch that El $0 are useful for modeling strict rules (with no exceptions) 
in conditional default bases, since, by definition, strict rules make some interpretations impossible. See 
Benferhat [2 ] 
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CY A p >[I cz A -p for all >r if and only if CY + p. But this is wrong if we choose >p 
such that n(a) = 0, i.e., {o 1 w b a} C_ El. Then: 
Proposition 12. ‘da $ I, ‘d’p, LY /= p if and only if LY A p >[I cy A -/3 for all >,E 
II+(A). 
The following theorem extends Propositions 11 and 12 and shows that the universal 
possibilistic consequence relation captures (and generates) exactly the same conclusions 
given by bco, i.e.: 
Theorem 13 (Soundness and completeness). If a default base A is consistent, ‘Jq5 p 
1, A kCo 4 + CCI @ ‘d >,k @(A),4 A $ >n 4 A -9 (i.e., @ 4 kvfl $1. 
The complete proof of the theorem can be found in [ 211. The proof is based on the 
fact that a set of conditional objects {/$\a, 1 i = 1, . . . , n} is consistent (i.e., does not 
entail a conditional contradiction of the form 114, or equivalently V’s 2 A, QC( S) can 
have the truth value T), if and only if there exists >,E ZIf( A) such that Vi, (pi A pi >I[ 
ai A lpi. The “only if” part is obtained by showing that if the quasi-conjunction of 
conditional objects is semantically equivalent to a conditional contradiction, then it leads 
to violate constraints (pi A pi >n ai A lpi (using the monotonicity and the transitivity of 
>I,). The “if part” consists in building a comparative distribution >r in a way which 
is similar to the Z-ranking procedure [42] based on toleration. 
Note that possibility distributions in II+(A) correspond to what Lehmann and Magi- 
dor [ 381 call “ranked models”. The above theorem is another way of stating the fact 
that the preferential closure of a set of conditional assertions is the intersection of all 
its rational extensions in accordance with the inference relation (since each comparative 
possibility distribution in ZY7+( A) generates a rational extension of A). Farifias de1 Cerro 
et al. [ 231 already proved that the universal possibilistic inference +=tln is preferential. 
Theorem 13 shows that any preferential consequence relation is of this form. 
6. Entailment based on the least specific solution over ZZ(A) 
The possibilistic universal consequence is cautious since there generally exist sev- 
eral comparative possibility distributions compatible with a given default base (and we 
consider all of them in the entailment). A more adventurous entailment consists in 
selecting one comparative possibility distribution, the least committed one, using the 
minimum specificity principle. 8 Namely, we select the possibility distribution compat- 
ible with the constraints which assigns to each interpretation the highest possibility 
value. Let A = {Lyi ---f pi 1 i = l,..., n} be a consistent set of conditional assertions, 
andC = {Ci: ai/Ipi >I[ aiA~/$ 1 i= l,... ,n} be a set of constraints restricting 
a family of possibility distributions. An algorithm which constructs the least specific 
’ In the qualitative case, >,,= {El, , En} is said to be less specific than > 
w E E( then w E Ej with j < i. 
+= {E{, , E:,,} iff V’w, if 
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comparative possibility distribution is given in [4]. It is unique and denoted by B~LS. 
The idea in this algorithm is to try to assign to each world w the highest possibility 
level (in forming a well-ordered partition) without violating the constraints. Namely, 
first we select for El the set of interpretations which do not falsify any rule in A. Next 
we remove from C constraints Ci such that there exists at least one interpretation w in 
El which satisfies ai A pi. We repeat this procedure to build E2, E3, . . . until J2 becomes 
empty, It is always possible to assume that >r~s is positive. 
Then, the nonmonotonic consequence relation is defined by: 
Definition 14. A formula $ is said to be an LS-consequence of 4, denoted by 4 krLs 
9, iff @ is a possibilistic consequence of 4 with respect to the comparative possibility 
distribution >?r~s. 
The ranking of models based on the minimum specificity principle is &he same as the 
one computed by Pearl [42] from his rule-ranking algorithm: 
Proposition 15 (see [ 41) . Given a set A of defaults {Lyi -+ pi 1 i = 1, . . . , n}, then the 
rank ordering function K on models given by System Z is such that: K(W) < K( w’) iff 
w ATLS a’. 
This is not surprising since it is easy to verify from Section 2 that K(O) = i - 1 iff 
w E Ei. 
It means that inferences obtained by System Z can be computed via possibilistic logic 
proof methods, first developed by Dubois, Lang and Prade in 1987 [ 151. Possibilistic 
logic enables classical logic to be extended to layered sets of formulas, where layers 
express certainty levels. The encoding of the layers is simply achieved by assigning to 
each formula 4 of K a weight a E [0, I], which expresses a constraint of the form 
N(4) > a. Inference in possibilistic logic can be achieved by means of the following 
extension of the resolution principle [ 151: 
(R) (~Vp,a),(aV&b) t (pV&min(a,b)). 
The use of this inference rule presupposes that a knowledge base K be put under 
clausal form, which turns out to be always possible. A knowledge base K is said to be 
inconsistent, if it is possible to derive the contradiction I with a certainty level a > 0 
from K by successive applications of (R). We denote by 1nc( K) = sup{a, K F (I, a)} 
the degree of inconsistency of K. In order to prove that 4 syntactically follows from 
K and the fact 4, denoted 4 t-K q, an extension of the refutation method has been 
proposed [ 161: 
(1) Computea=inc(KU((&,1)}). 
(2) Let K’ = KU {(gS,l)} U {(+, I)}. Compute b = Znc(K’). If b > a, then 
+ tK ti. 
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To use the possibilistic machinery for default reasoning, we first change each con- 
ditional assertion Lyi -+ /3i in A into a possibilistic formula (Tai V pi, ai) with ai = 
N( yai v /?i) and N is a necessity measure based on any numerical representative v~s 
of the least specific possibility distribution representing the default base A. Let Kd be the 
obtained possibilistic knowledge base. Then we can show that 4 t, 1/1 iff C#J krLs I+/J 
due to the soundness and completeness of possibilistic logic [ 16,341. Hence plausi- 
ble conclusions derived from evidence C$ and generic knowledge A can be computed 
via possibilistic logic proof methods. It has been shown (Lang [ 341) that the pos- 
sibilistic entailment I-K can be achieved with only log(n) satisfiability tests, where IZ 
is the number of uncertainty levels in K. System Z is a tool dedicated to conditional 
knowledge bases that has the same complexity (Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 301) , while pos- 
sibilistic logic was independently developed as a generic inconsistency tolerant theorem 
prover. 
Note that the possibilistic conclusions which are obtained from Kd and 4 are exactly 
the ones which are classically provable using the consistent part of the knowledge base 
made of the most certain formulas, i.e., the formulas whose weights are strictly greater 
than the level of inconsistency of Kd U { ( C#J, 1) }. Th is means that formulas whose weight 
is less than Znc( Kd U { (4, 1))) are simply inhibited even if they are not involved in 
any inconsistency. This problem is called the “drowning problem” [3]. For example, 
given the default base A = {a -+ J3, a -+ -8, p + 8, (Y + q5, C#I --) (cl). We can check 
that Kd = {(~(YV~,~),(~~~V~S,~),(~~VS,~),(~(YV~,~),(~~V~,~)}, with 
1 > a > b > 0. Then cy ~~~ $ is not sanctioned, since Znc( K4 U {( LY, 1))) = b 
and hence -4 V Cc, is “drowned” (namely in the context cy only the consistent subbase 
{ ( TLY V /3, a), (-WI V -6, a), (~a V 4, u)} is used). A particular case of the drowning 
problem is called by Pearl [42] “the blocking of property inheritance problem”: a 
subclass cannot inherit any property of a superclass as soon as the subclass is already 
exceptional with respect to one property of the superclass. This problem points out 
the main limitation of the various forms of rational closure inference, including the 
LS-consequence. 
7. Concluding discussions 
Fig. 1 summarizes the connections between the different approaches surveyed in this 
paper. All the approaches which appear in this figure share the following points: 
l From a syntactic point of view: they propose to extend the classical language by 
adding a new binary symbol (“-+” in System Z, “1” in the conditional object-based 
approach, >[I in the possibilistic approach, etc.) to encode conditional information. 
l From a semantic point of view, the approaches compute one or several complete 
pre-orderings between the classical interpretations. Each such ordering allows to 
select the preferred interpretations of a default base. 
The main contribution of the conditional object approach is to offer a simplification 
of the preferential semantics proposed by Kraus et al. [32] which is based on a two 
level structure, i.e., a triple (S, f, <) where (S, <) is a partial ordered set of states and 
f is a function from states to interpretations. 
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This paper has also pointed out that the main conditional approaches to nonmono- 
tonic inference, for the purpose of reasoning from generic, exception tolerant, rule-based 
systems can be captured in the setting of possibility theory. Namely, each nonmono- 
tonic inference relation satisfying acknowledged rationality postulates (including rational 
monotony) can be encoded in the possibilistic setting. Moreover, we have shown that 
the possibilistic treatment of conditional information via a principle of minimal com- 
mitment, gives the same results as the rational closure of Lehmann, or System Z of 
Pearl. Hence, it is possible to use generic proof methods of possibilistic logic [ 161, 
which are closely related to classical logic (refutation, resolution, semantic evaluation), 
to compute rational inferences from a default base. 
However, all the considered approaches suffer from the same limitations regarding 
the drowning problem. Some systematic methods for coping with this problem have 
been proposed, based on refined inconsistency handling (Geffner [ 271, Benferhat et al. 
[ 3,6], Lehmann [ 371) . But they always face counterexamples and have high complexity 
[ 10,401. A more promising way of overcoming this problem may be to add information 
about conditional independence of the form “in the context cr, accepting /3 has no 
influence on accepting 7”. This kind of information can be represented in the possibility 
theory framework by the joint constraints: N(ylcu) > 0 and N(yla A p) > 0, which are 
of the same form as the constraints modeling default rules. Work is in progress along 
these lines; see [5,13] for existing proposals. 
Lastly, the results of this paper only require an ordinal scale (exemplified by the 
well-ordered partition). Numbers used in System Z, as well as infinitesimals are not 
compulsory for the purpose of question-answering in a default base (modeled by one or 
several possibility distributions) on the basis of available pieces of evidence (modeled 
in propositional logic). Another issue is that of revising a default base by adding 
new rules (e.g., Boutilier and Goldszmidt [ 8]), or equivalently revising a possibility 
distribution by another one taken as an input (Dubois and Prade [ 221) . For this higher 
level revision problem, the question of whether purely ordinal tools are enough is still 
open. 
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